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BANKING LAW
Ronald L. Hersbergen*
ITEMS IN THE BANK COLLECTION PROCESS
Observance of Ordinary Care By Collecting Banks-Misencoding and
Misrouting of Items
The Louisiana Commercial Laws' carefully set out the duties of
collecting banks. Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:4-202(1) requires a col-
lecting bank to exercise ordinary care in all phases of its activities in
that capacity.' Section 4-202(2) sets out the time within which these
activities must be undertaken. Subsection (2) provides that a collecting
bank acts seasonably when it takes proper action in handling items,
payment proceeds, or notices before its midnight deadline.' A collecting
bank, 4 unlike a payor bank, can take proper action after its midnight
deadline, but has the burden of establishing the reasonableness of de-
laying beyond that point.' Section 4-202's requirement of ordinary care
in forwarding an item for presentment is embellished by section 4-204,
which permits a collecting bank to send items directly to the payor
bank. 6 However, the collecting bank does not have a duty to send items
directly. A collecting bank's duty under §4-202 is to use a reasonably
direct route and a reasonably prompt method of forwarding, 7 taking
Copyright 1988, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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1. The Commercial Laws are contained in Title 10 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes.
2. Those activities include presenting or sending an item for payment or acceptance,
returning dishonored items or sending notice of dishonor or nonpayment, settling for a
paid item upon final settlement, notifying its transferor of any loss or delay in transit,
and making or providing for any necessary protest (see La. R.S. 10:3-509 (1983)). La.
R.S. 10:4-202(1) (1983).
3. A bank's "midnight deadline" is midnight of the next banking day following
the banking day on which it receives the item or notice or from which the time for
taking proper action commences to run, whichever is later. La. R.S. 10:4-104(1)(h) (1983).
A "banking day" means that part of any day on which a bank is open to the public
for carrying on substantially all of its banking functions. La. R.S. 10:4-104(1)(c) (1983).
4. A payor bank that retains an item beyond its midnight deadline is accountable
for the amount of the item, no matter what the reason for retention, and whether or
not the item was properly payable. La. R.S. 10:4-302(a) (1983), 4-213(1)(d) (1983).
5. La. R.S. 10:4-202(2) (1983).
6. Id. § 4-204(2)(a) (1983).
7. Id, § 4-204(1).
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into account all relevant instructions of the transferor, the nature of
the item, 9 and any relevant course of dealing or usages of the trade.' 0
Therefore, in presenting items, a collecting bank exercises ordinary care
by using any of the methods for presentment expressly authorized by
Title 10" (including the mails, 12 a clearinghouse, 3 or a place requested
by the payor bank14). The notice required in the handling of dishonored
items may be given in any reasonable manner, by oral or written notice
or by returning the item itself. 5 The bank handles settlements upon
final payment with ordinary care by using any of the remittance media
authorized by section 4-211.16
Although the ordinary care requirement of section 4-202 does not
require the use of the Magnetic Ink Character Recognition System (MICR),
the banking system has almost universally implemented it. The MICR
system provides for the encoding of checks with magnetic numerical
characters that computers are programmed to "read." Under this system
the drawee-payor bank's identification number and the drawer's account
number are typically pre-encoded on the check. When the check is
deposited into a collecting bank, 7 the collecting bank encodes the amount
of the check on it.' The collecting bank's computer reads the drawee-
payor banks' encoded routing numbers on deposited checks, and then
automatically sorts and routes them to the appropriate drawee-payor
bank. 19 When the check arrives at the drawee-payor bank, that bank's
computer reads the bank's routing number and the drawer's account
number to verify that the check has come to the right bank. It then
reads the amount that the collecting bank has encoded and makes a
preliminary determination whether the check is properly payable. 20
8. Id. § 4-203 (1983).
9. Id. § 4-204(1) (1983).
10. Id. § 1-205 (1983).
11. Id. § 4-204(2) (1983).
12. Id. § 3-504(2)(a) (1983).
13. Id. § 3-504(2)(b) (1983).
14. Id. § 4-204(3) (1983).
15. Id. § 3-508(3) (1983). A collecting bank may return the dishonored item directly
to the depositary bank. Id. § 4-212(2) (1983).
16. Id. § 4-202(l)(c) (1983).
17. A "depositary bank" is simply the first collecting bank to which an item is
transferred for collection. Id. § 4-105(a) (1983). Thus, all depositary banks that are not
also payor banks are collecting banks. Id. § 4-105(d) (1983).
18. The collecting bank also customarily encodes the deposit ticket, which it uses to
make a provisional credit to the depositor's account.
19. See supra text accompanying notes 12-14.
20. La. R.S. 10:4-401(1) (1983). Any stop orders issued by drawer will also be
programmed into the computer, as would any other reasons for special treatment of one
or all of drawer's checks.
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Despite its obvious utility, the MICR system still must rely on
humans to do the amount encoding. Therefore, the banking system
cannot eliminate the slight risk of erroneous encoding. By paying in
accordance with the erroneous encoding the drawee-payor bank fails to
follow the drawer's order and thereby improperly charges the drawer's
account on the item, a violation of section 4-401(1).2 1 Moreover, in the
case of an erroneously encoded check, a drawee-payor bank's computer,
programmed to stop payment on a check solely by "reading" the encoded
amount thereof, will fail to effectuate the drawer's stop order. 22
21. An erroneously overencoded check, if paid according to the encoding, will result
in overpayment to the holder, and an excess debit to the drawer's account. This could
easily result in wrongful dishonor of other checks issued by the drawer or the wrongful
dishonor of the overencoded check itself. See La. R.S. 10:4-402 (1983). In either case,
the drawee-payor bank is bound to follow the actual order of the drawer and would be
liable to the drawer, but would have a right of recourse against the encoding collecting
bank. For an example of an overencoded check, see State ex rel. Gabalac v. Firestone
Bank, 46 Ohio App. 2d 124, 346 N.E.2d 326 (1975).
In the case of an erroneously underencoded check, the fallout is not so severe, since
neither unjust enrichment to the holder nor wrongful dishonor by reason of ostensible
insufficient funds are a likely result. In any event, the holder may force the drawee-payor
bank and the depositary-collecting bank to properly credit his account because he did not
-receive the face amount of the check. See First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Georgia R.R.
Bank & Trust Co., 238 Ga. 693, 235 S.E.2d 1 (1977); La. R.S. 10:4-213(a), 4-302(a)
(1983); in fact, the holder's right to sue the drawer on the underlying obligation would
be only discharged pro tanto by the underpayment. Id. § 3-603(1) (1983).
Examples of misencoded routing numbers are found in Morris v. Deluxe Check Printers,
Inc., 395 So. 2d 927 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981); Citizens State Bank v. Martin, 227 Kan.
580, 609 P.2d 670 (1980); and Exchange Bank of St. Augustine v. Florida Nat'l Bank
of Jacksonville, 292 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1974).
22. If the drawee-payor bank has programmed its computer to "key" on the mag-
netically encoded amount when it pulls out checks that are subjected to a customer's
stop payment order, even a one-cent encoding error by the collecting bank or a one-cent
error in the customer's stop order will prevent the computer from identifying the check
in question. See Delano v. Putnam Trust Co., 33 UCC Rep. 635 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1981)
(single digit, $100 error in description); Capital Bank v. Schuler, 421 So. 2d 633 (Fla.
App. 1982) (error as to amount in stop order); Staff Serv. Assoc., Inc. v. Midlantic Nat'l
Bank, 207 N.J. Super. 327, 504 A.2d 148 (1985) (single digit error in description); Poullier
v. Nacua Motors, Inc., 108 Misc. 2d 913, 499 N.Y.S.2d 85 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (a $4247.65
check was described in the stop order as a "$4287.65" check); Elsie Rodriguez Fashions,
Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 23 UCC Rep. 133 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (ten-cent error
in stop order description); Kunkel v. First Nat'l Bank, 393 N.W.2d 265 (N.D. 1986)
(amount of check inaccurately described in stop order); Parr v. Security Nat'l Bank, 680
P.2d 648 (Okla. App. 1984) (fifty-cent error in stop payment description); FJS Elec., Inc.
v. Fidelity Bank, 238 Pa. Super. 138, 431 A.2d 326 (1981) (the correct amount of the
check to be countermanded was $1844.98, but the stop payment order, programmed into
the computer, described that amount as "$1844.48").
William Hawkland, along with White and Summers, has taken the view that the
requirement in section 4-403 that the customer "afford the bank a reasonable opportunity
to act" as a condition of his right to stop payment should be judged in each case only
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The human element in the check encoding process revealed itself in
United States v. Hibernia National Bank.23 An employee of the collecting
bank encoded a $24,844.50 check as a $244,844.50 check. The encoded
amount did not result from a simple misreading of the check, nor from
an incorrect push of a button, as one might expect in such cases;14
rather, the drawer had so drawn the check that the upper right side
line reserved for an amount in figures read "$244844.50," while in the
body of check, where the amount is customarily expressed in words,
there appeared the typed-in amount of "$24844 DOLLARS/50 CENTS."
The collecting bank employee, realizing that the two amounts conflicted,
apparently decided that the higher amount was the amount intended by
drawer, and encoded the check accordingly. Predictably, the drawee
bank paid the check as encoded. Unfortunately, the lower figure was
the one intended and the payee was overpaid by $220,000.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:3-118(c) provides that words in an
instrument control figures, unless the words are ambiguous. z2 Hibernia
Bank argued that despite section 3-118(c), it was the customary banking
practice to encode checks for the amount appearing on the right side
after examining how the bank handles stop orders. A bank that keys only on the exact
amount of the check to be countermanded is not given a reasonable opportunity to find
the check in question if the amount of the check has not been precisely described and
encoded. The State of Florida enacted a variation of section 4-403 that provides that a
stop order is not effective unless it "describes with certainty the item on which payment
is-to be stopped." Fla. Stats. § 674.4-403(1) (1977). Thus, in Schuler the bank prevailed,
while in all of the other above enumerated cases, with -the exception of the Poullier case,
the drawer-customer emerged the winner. In Poullier, the court held for the bank because
it had advised the drawer-customer that her stop order would not be effective unless she
provided the exact amount of the check. Both Poullier and Parr indicate that it might
be reasonable for a bank to demand that the customer supply the exact amount of a
check before it allows a countermand, as long as the drawer-customer is advised of this
at the time the stop order is requested. The bank's case would be much stronger if the
bank-customer agreement so advised the customer. See La. R.S. 10:4-103(1) (1983); cf.
Hughes v. Marine Midland Bank, 127 Misc. 2d 209, 484 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (1985) (suggests
that banks have a duty to program computers to identify stopped checks by both number
and amount).
23. 841 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1988).
24. State ex rel. Gabalac v. Firestone Bank, 460 Ohio App. 2d 124, 346 N.E.2d 326
(1975) ($45 check erroneously encoded as "$10,045" item); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co., 238 Ga. 693, 235 S.E.2d 1 (1977) ($25,000 check
misencoded as "$2,500" item).
25. The premise that the "words" line should control the typed, or written "figures"
line is bifurcated: in the first place, words are more difficult to alter than figures, United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 244 S.C. 436, 137 S.E.2d 582 (1964);
moreover, as explained in Payne v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 177 Cal. 687, 169 P. 1007,
1008 (1917), "a man is more apt to commit an error ... in writing a figure than in
writing a word, and ... the words ought to be deemed the better and more solemn
statement, and therefore should govern."
[Vol. 49
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of the check (the figure line) rather than the amount on the line reserved
for a word-description (the words line).2 6 The Fifth Circuit rejected this
argument on the basis that "[c]ommercial custom does not apply where
the U.C.C. provides otherwise. ' 27 The court added that it would be
inequitable to apply this custom absent evidence that the drawer had
been informed of it.28 Although section 1-103 permits the parties to
expressly stipulate a usage of trade in a contract, even if inconsistent
with section 3-118(c), no such contract existed between Hibernia and
the drawer. 29
The court found that although the check did not state an amount
in words, the amount expressed as "24844 DOLLARS/50 CENTS" on
the line customarily reserved for a word-description of the amount should
be considered "words." 30 Therefore, under 3-118(c), this amount should
26. 841 F.2d at 595.
27. Id.
28. A "custom" is a "usage of trade," defined in section 1-205(2) as "any practice
or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade
as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in
question." Under section 1-205(3) (1983) an applicable usage of trade "give[s] particular
meaning to, and supplement[s] or qualiflies], the terms of an agreement." Of course,
there was no agreement between the United States as drawer and Hibernia Bank as the
collecting bank in the instant case, but even as between parties to an agreement, a custom
or usage of trade does not bind a party without actual or constructive knowledge of it.
St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Garvey Elevators, Inc., 505 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1974);
Clark v. General Foods Corp., 81 II1. App. 3d 74, 400 N.E.2d 1027 (1980); Buxton v.
Harsh, 631 S.W.2d 95 (Mo. App. 1982).
In cases involving agreements between relatively sophisticated business persons and
relatively unsophisticated consumers, Louisiana decisions have not recognized a custom
or trade usage unless the customer was aware of it. See, e.g., Deutschmann v. Standard
Fur Co., 331 So. 2d 219 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976); Larriviere v. Roy Young, Inc., 333
So. 2d 254 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); Leithman v. Dolphin Swimming Pool Co., 252 So.
2d 557 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 259 La. 1055, 254 So. 2d 464 (1971).
29. Hibernia also argued that section 4-213, which provides that "[u]pon final payment
... the payor bank shall be accountable for the amount of the item," prevented the
drawer's recovery. 841 F.2d at 596. This "final payment" rule bars recovery on the
instrument once final payment has been made. The court, however, found that the action
was not on the instrument but for an amount in excess of the instrument (that is, the
difference between the amount for which this check was drawn and the encoded amount).
Therefore the claim was not precluded by the final payment rule. Id.
30. Clearly the sum "24844 DOLLARS/50 CENTS" does not describe the amount
payable entirely in words. However, in a decision involving identical facts, an Indiana
court of appeals held that the impressions made on the "words" line by a check imprinter
were not "printed items" that were controlled by the typewritten terms of the "amount"
line under section 3-118(b), but rather were "words" that controlled the figures on the
"amount" line, pursuant to section 3-118(c). St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. State
Bank of Salem, 412 N.E.2d 103 (Ind. App. 1980). In the Hibernia Bank case, the figure
"24844" on the "words" line was typewritten. 841 F.2d at 593. Assuming that the
"$244,844.50" figure on the "amount" line was also typed, the State Bank of Salem
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control and, as between drawer and drawee, the drawer should be entitled
to a recrediting of the $220,000 overpayment.
The erroneous overpayment by the drawee in United States v. Hib-
ernia Bank would be recoverable by the drawee as a mistaken payment,3
against either the collecting bank or the holder. Alternatively, the drawee
could premise the action against the collecting bank on negligence under
section 4-202(l)(a).
Observance of Ordinary Care and Reasonable Banking Standards By
Collecting Banks and Payor Banks-Alterations and Unauthorized
Signatures
In a case involving payment of an overencoded check, not only
does the drawee-payor bank have a right of action against the collecting
bank, but the drawer also has a right of action against the drawee-
payor bank.3 2 The ordinary care observed by the drawee-payor bank is
not determinative in this sort of case, even if, as in United States v.
Hibernia Bank, the drawer has not observed ordinary care in drawing
the check or in examining the check once it was returned to him as a
paid item.33 However, in the case of payment of an item that is altered
or that contains an unauthorized signature the care observed by both
the drawer and the drawee is significant.
case requires that the "24844" control as "words" under § 3-118(c); but if the larger
amount was handwritten one could argue that the higher amount should control as
"handwritten terms over typewritten" under section 3-118(b), although the State Bank of
Salem decision might suggest the contrary.
31. La. R.S. 10:3-418 (1983) makes payment of an instrument "final" and unrecov-
erable under the general law of mistake or payment of a thing not due if the payment
is in favor of a holder in due course, or a person who has in good faith changed his
position in reliance on the payment. In United States v. Hibernia Bank, 841 F.2d 592,
593 (5th Cir. 1988), the payee-holder knew that its check had been overpaid so could
not have benefited from section 3-418.
32. La. R.S. 10:4-401 (1983). In United States v. Hibernia Bank, the United States
was both drawer and drawee: the Army, the drawer and the Treasury Department, the
drawee.
33. Neither section 3-406 (1983) nor section 4-406 (1983) actually permit the drawee
to raise the negligence of the drawer when there is no unauthorized signature or alteration.
Section 3-118(c) should pretermit the negligence of a drawer who issues a check that bears
conflicting amounts, as the Fifth Circuit held in Hibernia. However, if the drawer fails
to notice the $220,000 excess debit to its account, a court might look by analogy to the
preclusions against recovery by a customer who fails to discover alterations, as provided
in sections 4-406(1) and (2), or negligence by way of section 1-103. To the extent, however,
that a court might entertain such a negligence argument, it should also consider section
4-406(3) (1983) which provides that a bank may not raise the customer's failure to discover
an alteration if the bank has not exercised reasonable care. Query: would a drawee-bank
exercise ordinary care if it paid solely in accordance with the collecting bank's encoded
amount without comparing it to the amount actually reflected on the face of the check
as the drawer drew it?
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Payment of such an item by drawee-payor banks is an improper
payment in violation of sections 4-401(1) and 3-419(1). If, however, the
drawer has been negligent in drafting the check or in examining the
check after it is returned to him as paid, the drawee-payor bank can
preclude him under sections 3-406 and 4-406 from raising the fact of
an alteration or unauthorized signature. 4 But even if the drawer's neg-
ligence substantially contributed to the alteration or the unauthorized
signature, the drawee-payor bank may not utilize this preclusion if the
item was not paid "in accordance with the reasonable commercial stan-
dards" of the banking business. 5 The preclusion likewise does not apply
against a drawer who was negligent in examining the returned item if
the drawee-payor bank failed to observe ordinary care in paying the
item.3 6 Therefore, although the drawer's negligence is relevant, the de-
terminative issue in alteration-unauthorized signature cases is the care
exercised by the drawee-payor bank.37
Even though both drawer and drawee may have been negligent and
contributed to the mistaken payment there is no apportionment of
liability. United States v. Hibernia Bank holds that since the UCC places
liability on the party who is in the best position to guard against the
particular mistaken payment, comparative fault principles are not gen-
erally applicable to such cases.18
As with a drawee bank, a collecting bank that remits the payment
proceeds of an item bearing an unauthorized signature of an indorser3 9
is liable to the true owner under section 3-419(l).40 However, the col-
34. La. R.S. 10:3-406, 4-406(1), (2) (1983).
35. Id. § 3-406 (1983).
36. Id. § 4-406(3) (1983).
37. Section 3-406 requires that the drawer or holder negligence have "substantially
contributed" to the making of the unauthorized signature or alteration, while section 4-
406(2) requires only that the customer be shown to have "failed ... to comply" with
section 4-406(l)'s duty to "exercise reasonable care and promptness ... to discover his
unauthorized signature or any alteration ... and ... notify the bank promptly after
discovery thereof." (emphasis added).
38. 841 F.2d at 596.
39. The issue of drawer or holder negligence vis-a-vis collecting bank's ordinary care
and observance of reasonable commercial standards does not arise in cases involving
alterations and forged drawer signatures since collecting banks are not liable to drawers
or holders for the mere handling of such items under section 3-419(1) (1983). A collecting
bank's warranty under section 4-207(1) (1983) arguably runs both to the drawee-bank and
to the drawer as "payors." Sun'N Sand, Inc. v. United California Bank, 582 P.2d 920
(Cal. 1978). A collecting bank that is a holder in due course and acts in good faith,
however, does not make warranties with respect to alterations and drawer signatures.
Thus, a collecting bank usually has no need to resort to section 3-406.
40. Because the pertinent language of section 3-419(1) is "when a person pays an
instrument on a forged indorsement, he is liable to the true owner," the issue arises
whether collecting banks, which do not "pay" an item, can be liable as a result of this
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lecting bank that observed ordinary care in payment of the proceeds
can also raise payee or holder negligence that substantially contributed
to the making of the unauthorized indorsement to preclude the negligent
payee or holder from asserting such lack of authority against the col-
lecting bank.
Despite some conceptual similarity, the observance of ordinary care
by a drawee bank in paying an item is factually quite different from
that of a collecting bank in handling the item or the proceeds of the
item. Of the three principal categories of problem items (those bearing
material alterations 4 ' those bearing unauthorized drawer signatures, 42
and those bearing forged indorsements43) a collecting bank has liability
exposure only for forged indorsements. While a drawee bank cannot
properly pay44 any of the three categories of items, the bank's own lack
of ordinary care is typically an issue only with respect to the items
bearing unauthorized drawer signatures. 45
section (emphasis added). Section 3-419(3) limits the section 3-419(1) exposure of collecting
banks, which supports an argument that the Louisiana legislature assumed that collecting
banks could be liable by means of section 3-419(1) as persons who "pay." However,
section 3-419 is a faithful adoption of UCC section 3-419, with the exception that the
Louisiana legislature substituted the language "he is liable to the true owner" for the
UCC language "an instrument is converted when .... ," in order to delete the UCC's
reference to common law "conversion." La. R.S. 10:3-419, comment (1983). The issue
of collecting bank liability arises because, at common law, both the act of the drawee
in paying an item bearing an unauthorized indorsement and the act of a collecting bank
in remitting the payment proceeds to one other than the true owner were considered to
be a "conversion" of the item. In short, common law conversion was not just a matter
of the act of payment by a drawee, but of remitting the proceeds thereof to someone
other than the rightful owner of the item. See Cooper v. Union Bank, 9 Cal. 3d 371,
507 P.2d 609 (1973). By promising that one who pays an instrument bearing a forged
indorsement will be liable, the Louisiana legislature may have inadvertently insulated
collecting banks from liability under section 3-419(1). Section 3-419(3) would thereby take
on a particularly anomalous character because Louisiana has no common law "conversion"
remedy as the source of this "insulation." See M. Feitel House Wrecking Co. v. Citizens
Bank & Trust Co., 159 La. 752, 106 So. 292 (1925).
41. La. R.S. 10:3-407, 4-401(1), 4-406(1) (1983).
42. Id. §§ 3-404(1), 4-401(1), 4-406(1), 3-419(1) (1983).
43. Id. §§ 3-301(2), 3-404(1), 3-419(1) (1983).
44. Id. § 4-401(1) (1983).
45. As already mentioned payment of an item bearing an unauthorized indorsement
is an improper payment under section 4-401, but the drawer whose negligence substantially
contributed to the making of the unauthorized indorsement is precluded from raising that
issue under section 3-406. Since a drawee-payor bank is normally unfamiliar with the
signature of remote parties, it is not in a position to know when a given indorsement is
not genuine; hence, it is unlikely that a negligent drawer could avoid the preclusion of
section 3-406 by showing that the drawee did not follow "reasonable commercial standards"
in paying the item with an unauthorized indorsement.
Payment of an item that is missing a necessary indorsement is also improper under
section 4-401, and arguably a payor would not be in accordance with reasonable commercial
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When a drawee-payor bank has paid an item bearing an unauthorized
drawer signature46 to which the drawer's own negligence has substantially
contributed, the bank's exercise of ordinary care under section 4-406(3)
becomes a difficult issue to determine. Given its ability to compare the
purported drawer signature on the item with the drawer's authorized
signature on the "signature card," the bank may not have exercised
ordinary care when it fails to detect an unauthorized signature. Clearly,
a drawee-payor bank's exercise of ordinary care does not require it to
hire an expert handwriting analyst to detect skillful forgeries.4 7 It is
equally clear that a failure to compare the signatures on the check and
on the signature card solely on the basis that it is too expensive or too
standards in so paying, given the ease of examining the item to determine the presence
of some indorsement. See Thoreson v. Citizens State Bank, 294 N.W.2d 397 (N.D. 1980).
However, it is unlikely that the drawer's negligence was in any manner involved in the
failure of the payee or other holder to indorse; moreover, a missing indorsement is not
an "unauthorized" indorsement under section 3-406. Cf. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Connecticut
Bank & Trust Co., 40 Conn. Supp. 70, 481 A.2d III (Conn. Super. 1984).
Payment of an item bearing a material alteration is improper under section 4-401(1)
(although the original tenor of the item can be properly charged to the drawer's account,
section 4-401(2)(a)). But even where the drawer's negligence has substantially contributed
to the making of the alteration, it is unlikely that the drawee-payor bank's payment would
be contrary to "reasonable commercial standards" under section 3-406 or not in accordance
with "ordinary care" under section 4-406(3), in the absence of visible evidence of the
alteration. Cf. Hanover Ins. Co. v. Brotherhood State Bank, 482 F. Supp. 501 (D. Kan.
1979) ("conspicuous and maladroit" alteration of payee's name).
46. In the context of sections 3-406 and 4-406, a drawer's failure to sign his check
is not considered an "unauthorized signature" and therefore the drawee-payor bank may
not use either section to preclude the drawer from raising the bank's violation of section
4-401(1) in paying the item. Even if section 3-406 or 4-406 did apply to such checks, a
drawee bank that paid such an item would not be exercising "ordinary care" or "reasonable
commercial standards"; hence, drawees typically lose such cases and must recredit the
drawer's account to the extent of any loss the drawer suffered (obviously, if the intended
payee was paid, there is no loss to drawer). Cf. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. United States
Nat'l Bank of Oregon, 276 Or. 945, 558 P.2d 328 (1976) (applying sections 3-406 and
4-406 by analogy). Where, however, the terms of the checking account agreement require
two or more drawer signatures, a check missing one of two signatures is considered to
be an "unauthorized signature case" under sections 3-406 and 4-406. G & R Corp. v.
American Sec. & Trust Co., 523 F.2d 1164 (D.C. 1975); Trust Co. Bank v. Atlanta IBM
Emp. Fed. Credit Union, 254 Ga. 262, 264 S.E.2d 202 (1980). Contra, Rascar, Inc. v.
Bank of Oregon, 87 Wis. 2d 446, 275 N.W.2d 108 (Ct. App. 1978); Madison Park Bank
v. Field, 64 II1. App. 838, 381 N.E.2d 1030 (1978).
47. Industrial Systems of Huntsville, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank, 376 So. 2d 742
(Ala. App. 1979). A drawee bank is presumed to know the signatures of its customers,
Indiana Nat'l Corp. v. FACO, Inc., 400 N.E.2d 202 (Ind. App. 1988), but the actual
procedure used by a bank need only be reasonably adapted to catch unauthorized signatures
of its customers. Medford Irrigation Dist. v. Western Bank, 66 Or. App. 589, 676 P.2d
329 (1984); Winkie v. Heritage Bank, 92 Wis. 2d 784, 299 N.W.2d 829 (1981); Nu-Way
Serv., Inc. v. Mercantile Trust Co., 530 S.W.2d 743 (Mo. App. 1975).
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time-consuming to make the comparison on all checks4" is not the exercise
of ordinary care. Therefore, it is rational to assume that if a reasonable
comparative examination would have detected the unauthorized signature
and yet the item was paid, the drawee will have failed to observe ordinary
care or reasonable commercial standards, and the section 3-406 and
4-406 preclusions become unavailable to the drawee-payor bank.
49
In a recent decision, American Security Bank v. American Motorists
Insurance Co.,S° the court held that the drawee-payor bank failed to
exercise ordinary care under sections 3-406 and 4-406 when it paid checks
bearing unauthorized and misspelled signatures of the drawer's authorized
agent. The drawee-payor bank's procedures, which involved a compar-
ative examination of signatures, complied with "reasonable commercial
banking standards." The lack of ordinary care was the failure of the
bank's employee, operating within that procedure, to detect the mis-
spelling of the authorized signer's name. 5
The case of Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. Zapata
Corp.5 2 raises a different issue of "reasonable commercial banking stan-
dards": can a drawee-payor bank establish an unauthorized drawer
signature detection procedure that does not attempt to check all sig-
natures but yet is consistent with reasonable commercial standards and
the exercise of ordinary care? The detection procedure in question pro-
vided for the comparative examination of all checks over $1000, the
examination of particular checks between $100 and $1000 if there is a
reason to suspect a possible forgery (such as a customer warning), and
the random examination of one percent of all other checks between
$100 and $1000, but did not provide for the examination of any other
checks less than $1000. If most of the banks in the nation follow this
procedure, as the bank's expert testimony established in Zapata," and
48. Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Kidwell Constr. Co., 463 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. App.
1971); Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank of Memphis, Inc., 55 Tenn. App. 545, 403 S.W.2d
109 (1966).
49. While an examination and comparison of the signatures on the check and on
the signature card will not detect a skillful forgery of the drawer's name, it will detect
obvious forgeries and missing necessary drawer signatures. La Sara Grain Co. v. First
Nat'l Bank, 673 S.W.2d 558 (Tex.), on remand, 676 S.W.2d 183 (Civ. App. 1984);
American Sec. Bank v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 538 A.2d 736 (D.C. App. 1988).
50. 538 A.2d 736 (D.C. App. 1988).
51. Drawer had authorized five persons to sign company checks; one of the five was
its executive director, Barney Sellers. Mr. Sellers' name was signed, without authority, as
"Barney Seller" on some twenty checks, totalling over $38,000. The court's premise in
finding a lack of ordinary care by the bank was, apparently, that because an authorized
signer is unlikely to misspell his own name, a misspelling is a suspicious circumstance
into which a reasonably prudent banker should inquire.
52. 848 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1988).
53. Id. at 294.
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the banking industry experts recommend such a procedure, then section
4-103(3) states, in accord with Zapata, that such a procedure, which is
"consistent . . .with a general banking usage not disapproved by this
Chapter, prima facie constitutes the exercise of ordinary care." 5 4 A bank
that employs such a procedure concedes that it will have to absorb all
losses that result from the payment of unexamined checks bearing unau-
thorized drawer signatures to which the drawer did not substantially
contribute. The effect of Zapata upon unexamined checks falling within
sections 3-406 and 4-406 that bear reasonably detectable forgeries or
that are missing one of multiple necessary signatures is to place primary
importance on the drawer-customer's section 4-406(1) duty to examine
his returned items for any unauthorized signature.
Zapata can be justified on the basis of efficiency as well as on the
basis of equitable considerations. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National
Bank's testimony, unchallenged by Zapata Corporation, revealed that
its selective examination procedure, compared with its pre-1981 procedure
of examining each check, saved $125,000 per year. Moreover, the bank's
testimony showed that the selective examination procedure led to no
significant increase in the number of undetected forgeries, strongly sug-
gesting that forgery of drawer signatures on checks under $1000 is
statistically insignificant. Zapata suggests that even if an increase in the
number of undetected forgeries had resulted from the selective exami-
nation procedure, its use is still reasonable in light of the costs savings
to the bank."
Collecting banks and payor banks confront the ordinary care issue
of sections 3-406 and 4-40656 in considerably different factual back-
grounds. While payor banks are concerned with missing indorsements,
they are mainly concerned with alterations and unauthorized drawer
54. See also Coleman v. Brotherhood State Bank, 3 Kan. App. 2d 162, 592 P.2d
103 (1979); Vending Chattanooga, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 730 S.W.2d
624 (Tenn. 1987). The prima facie rule of section 4-103(3) shifts the burden to the drawer
to show that the banking usage itself is unreasonable.
55. The issue raised in Zapata is whether the selective examination procedure used
by the bank was reasonably related to the detection of unauthorized drawer signatures.
The bank carried that issue in Zapata, but in Medford Irrigation Dist. v. Western Bank,
66 Or. App. 589, 676 P.2d 329 (1984), the court held that a drawee bank's procedure
that abandoned sight verification and automatically paid all checks under $5000 was a
"lack of ordinary care" as a matter of law and contrary to reasonable commercial banking
standards and affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment; cf. Five Towns
College v. Citibank, 108 A.2d 420, 489 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1985) (summary judgment denied
where drawee abandoned all verification procedures).
56. Although not expressly mentioned in either section 3-406 or section 4-406, col-
lecting banks traditionally are allowed to raise drawer or holder negligence as a preclu-
sionary device, but only if, as a payor bank, the collecting bank has observed ordinary
care while handling the item in question.
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signatures under sections 4-401 and 3-419(1); 57 by contrast, collecting
banks are almost exclusively concerned with missing or unauthorized
indorsements under sections 3-419(1) 5s and 4-207(1) and 3-417(1). 59 A
collecting bank typically encounters litigation when it presents an item
for payment, obtains the proceeds that represent that payment, and then
permits someone other than the holder ("true owner") to withdraw or
draw against the proceeds. The true owner may bring an action against
the drawee-payor bank or the collecting bank under section 3-419(1).
However, if the true owner sues the collecting bank, the preclusion issue
of section 3-406 can arise. The true owner's negligence that substantially
contributed to the unauthorized indorsement will preclude him from
raising a section 3-419(1) action against a collecting bank that has
observed reasonable commercial standards. Even if the true owner's lack
of "substantially contributing" negligence permits him to avoid the
preclusion of section 3-406, if the collecting bank dealt with the in-
strument or the proceeds thereof in accordance with applicable reasonable
commercial standards the bank's section 3-419(1) liability is limited to
the amount of payment proceeds remaining in its hands. 60
57. The drawer-customer's action is premised on section 4-401; the holder's action
is premised on section 3-419(1), a section available only to the "true owner" of an
instrument paid "on a forged indorsement."
58. See supra notes 39-40.
59. Under section 3-417(1) a collecting bank can be viewed as a "person who obtains
payment" and thereby warrants good title to "a person who ... pays," and in the case
of a check, the "person who pays" is the drawer. See Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v. United
California Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 582 P.2d 920, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1978).
60. La. R.S. 10:3-419(3) (1983). The effect of section 3-419(3) must be judged in
light of the interpretation of the word "proceeds" by the California Supreme Court in
Cooper v. Union Bank, 9 Cal. 3d 371, 507 P.2d 609, 107 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1973). In the
Cooper case the defendant-collecting bank had collected the proceeds of twenty-nine checks
bearing an unauthorized payee signature, and had permitted the payee's faithless employee-
rascal to "cash" or withdraw the proceeds. The California court held, however, that
section 3-419(3) was unavailable to the defendant-collecting bank because the "proceeds"
of the twenty-nine checks had been "commingled" with the bank's general funds and
thus it still had those funds "in its hands" under section 3-419(3). The reasoning of the
California court is, more or less, as follows: when a collecting bank permits early
withdrawal of provisional credit, or "cashes" an item for its customer, the customer
becomes a debtor, and the collecting bank a creditor that uses the actual payment
"proceeds" of the item, when received from the drawer-payor bank, to repay itself;
hence, what the customer actually receives is not the "proceeds" of the check he deposited
for collection. Moreover, even when an item is not "cashed," and therefore the provisional
credit is not drawn against or withdrawn early, one can still argue that the customer does
not receive "proceeds," since, at the moment of final payment by the drawee-payor bank
under section 4-213(1) (1983), the drawee-payor bank is accountable for the amount of
the item, and provisional settlements are final. This means that the collecting bank is a
debtor, and its customer a creditor on a debt that will be paid by the collecting bank
other than with earmarked proceeds. The Cooper approach to section 3-419(3) is discussed
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Alternatively, the true owner can forego his action against the payor
and collecting banks and sue the drawer on the underlying obligation. 6'
The drawer in turn may sue either the drawee-payor bank under section
4-401(1) or the collecting bank under the warranty of title of §3-417(1).62
When the drawer elects to sue the collecting bank, if the bank has
observed reasonable commercial standards, it may assert the preclusions
of both section 3-406 and section 4-406.63
The following describes recurring instances in which a collecting
bank faces possible liability for failing to observe ordinary care or
reasonable commercial banking standards by permitting a check bearing
an unauthorized indorsement or lacking a necessary indorsement to be
deposited for collection, or by "cashing" such a check. For the most
part, courts have found that the listed examples simply were "suspicious
circumstances," and in every instance a jury question was generated,
at the least; but courts have held in some of these examples that ordinary
care or reasonable commercial standards were not observed as a matter
of law:
- checks payable to a collecting bank to which the drawer is
not indebted;6
- checks missing a necessary indorsement; 6
in more detail in Comment, Forged Indorsements, Depositary Banks, and the Defense of
Section 3-419(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 18 Hous. L. Rev. 173, at 192-94
(1980).
61. A check is considered as a "conditional" payment of the underlying obligation.
When the true owner is not paid, the drawer is left without a defense to the true owners
suit on the underlying obligation. See Ray v. Canal Bank & Trust Co., 186 La. 547, 173
So. 101 (1937).
62. See supra note 59.
63. See Sun'N Sand, Inc. v. United California Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 582 P.2d 920,
148 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1978).
64. Id.; see, e.g., Bullitt County Bank v. Publishers Printing Co., 684 S.W.2d 289
(Ky. App. 1984); Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. of Alexandria v. C & R Dev. Co., 260
La. 1176, 258 So. 2d 543 (1972). Such checks put a collecting bank "on inquiry" as to
the authority of the drawer's agent to receive the proceeds of payment, by either "cashing"
the check or depositing it for collection into a personal account; a collecting bank failing
to make such an inquiry handles the check at its peril.
65. See, e.g., FDIC v. Marine Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville, 431 F.2d 341 (5th Cir.
1970); Berkheimers, Inc. v. Citizens Valley Bank, 270 Or. 807, 529 P.2d 903 (1974);
Millens v. Kingston Trust Co., 118 Misc. 2d 512, 461 N.Y.S.2d 938 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
Frequently, the missing necessary indorsement is that of one of two co-payees (not in
the alternative). If the two co-payees happen to be partners or joint-venturers, both need
not indorse, and the collecting bank will be insulated from liability for handling the item
on the basis of only one signature. See La. R.S. 10:1-201 ("organization," "person").
Boyer v. First Nat'l Bank of Kokomo, 476 N.E.2d 895 (Ind. App. 1985); Cf. Grosberg
v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 420 Mich. 707, 362 N.W.2d 715 (1984).
A check bearing a forgery of a necessary indorsement creates problems for payor banks
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- forged co-payee indorsements; 66
- failure to ascertain that payee and indorser are one and the
same
67
- failure to inquire when depositor is not the payee nor payee's
authorized agent;
68
- failure to abide by a restrictive indorsement;6
- checks payable or indorsed to a representative, deposited into
a personal account;70
under section 4-401(1) and for collecting banks under section 4-207(1) not because it bears
a forgery, but because it lacks a necessary indorsement. See La. R.S. 10:3-302(2) and 3-
401(1) (1983). Theoretically then, an item can bear any number of forged indorsements
with no resulting problems for banks, so long as the item is missing no necessary
indorsements, and so long as the true owner receives the payment proceeds. Section 3-
419(1), however, is predicated on payment of an instrument "on a forged indorsement";
accordingly, payment on a missing necessary indorsement does not fit squarely into section
3-419(1) in Louisiana. In the common law jurisdictions, courts simply point out that
U.C.C. section 1-103 incorporates the general principles of common law conversion in
the case of the missing necessary indorsement. See Berkheimers, Inc. v. Citizens Valley
Bank, supra. Since there is no common law of conversion for La. R.S. 10:1-103 (1983)
to incorporate, a collecting bank should not be liable under La. R.S. 10:3-419(1) for
handling an item with a missing necessary indorsement. See Top Crop Seed & Supply
Co. v. Bank of Southwest La., 392 So. 2d 738 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980). Nevertheless,
it has been held to be negligence for a collecting bank to handle such checks. See Davis
v. Miller Builders & Developers, Inc., 340 So. 2d 409 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
66. See, e.g., Tubin v. Rabin, 389 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd, 553 F.2d
255 (5th Cir. 1976); Montgomery v. First Nat'l Bank, 265 Or. 55, 508 P.2d 428 (1973);
Atlas Bldg. Supply Co. v. First Indep. Bank of Vancouver, 15 Wash. App. 367, 550
P.2d 26 (1976). But see Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 98 Wis. 2d 474, 297
N.W.2d 46 (App. 1980). A typical case involves the act of one co-payee in forging the
indorsement of the other and then cashing or depositing the check into his account.
67. See, e.g., National Bank v. Refrigerated Transp. Co., 147 Ga. App. 240, 248
S.E.2d 496 (1978); Society Bank of Cleveland v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 30 Ohio App. 2d
1, 281 N.E.2d 563 (1972); Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Greater Houston Bank, 662 S.W.2d 642
(Tex. App. 1983); cf. Trust Co. of Ga. Bank v. Port Term. & Warehousing Co., 153
Ga. App. 735, 266 S.E.2d 254 (1980) (mere showing that collecting bank failed to verify
ostensibly valid indorsements not sufficient to establish failure of ordinary care as a matter
of law); Gillen v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 274 Md. 96, 333 A.2d 329 (1975) (collecting
bank dealt with a known customer, who deposited a check bearing a forgery of the
payee's indorsement, a forgery by the customer's transferor; bank's failure to question
the authenticity of the payee indorsement held reasonable). Knesz v. Central Jersey Bank
& Trust Co., 97 N.J. 1, 477 A.2d 806 (1984) (collecting bank dealt with its regular
customer, not with the forger; held that bank observed ordinary care).
68. See, e.g., Landmark Bank v. Hegeman-Harris Co., 522 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. App.
1988); Citizens Bank, Dallas v. Thorton & Co., 172 Ga. App. 490, 323 S.E.2d 688 (1984);
Salsman v. National Community Bank, 102 N.J. Super. 482, 246 A.2d 162 (1968), aff'd,
105 N.J. Super. 164, 251 A.2d 460 (1969).
69. See In re Quantum Dev. Corp., 397 F. Supp. 329 (D.C. Virgin Islands 1975);
Salsman, 102 N.J. Super. 482, 246 A.2d 162.
70. Id.
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- failure to verify an agent's purported or ostensible authority
to open a corporate account; 7'
- failure to inquire about the authority of an agent to indorse
and deposit into his personal account, or to "cash" a check
that is payable to a corporate-payee; 72
Where there are actual irregularities on the check itself, such as an
alteration of the payee's name, 7 a typewritten indorsement, 74 a "chain
of title" problem in the indorsements,"' or a failure to follow the bank's
own standard internal operating procedures, 76 the issue of ordinary care
will also be present.
Availability of Funds to the Depositing Customer
Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:4-213(4)(a) provides that a provisional
credit which is given by a collecting bank to the account of a customer
71. See Continental Bank v. Wa-Ho Truck Brokerage, 122 Ariz. 414, 595 P.2d 206
(1979); First Bank & Trust of Jonesboro v. Vaccari, 288 Ark. 233, 703 S.W.2d 867 (1986);
Hydroflo Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Omaha, 217 Neb. 20, 349 N.W.2d 615 (1984).
Once the bogus account is established, checks made payable to the corporate-payee will
be deposited therein, and converted, by the faithless agent.
72. See, e.g., Lincoln Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bank of Commerce, 764 F.2d 392
(5th Cir. 1985); Confederate Welding & Safety Supply, Inc. v. Bank of the Mid-South,
458 So. 2d 1370 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984), writ denied, 462 So. 2d 1264 (1985); Pargas,
Inc. v. Estate of Taylor, 416 So. 2d 1358 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982). In Pargas, a faithless
employee indorsed, without authority, sixty-four checks payable to his employer, Pargas,
and deposited them into his personal account at Rapides Bank & Trust Co. The bank
did not seek from Pargas a corporate resolution or certified bylaw authorizing the employee
to indorse or to deposit such checks into his personal account, nor did the bank make
any other inquiry, even though the bank's standard internal operating procedure called
for such. In concluding that the bank's conduct fell below "reasonable commercial
standards" the third circuit took judicial notice of the fact that checks payable to a
corporation are not normally indorsed (in this case "in blank" by the use of a return
address stamp) and delivered to employees or other third parties. 416 So. 2d at 1361.
By contrast, the faithless employee in Confederate Welding was authorized to indorse
checks payable to his employer for deposit into the corporate account; he was not
authorized to indorse for deposit into his personal account. Both Pargas and Confederate
Welding contain certain citations to numerous decisions in factually similar cases. Pre-
dictably, the collecting banks in such cases raise the issue of apparent authority; the
decision in Lilliedahl & Mitchel v. Avoyelles Trust & Sav., 352 So. 2d 781 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1977) makes that defensive posture very difficult to erect.
73. See Hanover Ins. Co. v. Brotherhood State Bank, 482 F. Supp. 501 (D. Kan.
1979).
74. See Bank of the West v. Wes-Con Dev. Co., 15 Wash. App. 238, 548 P.2d 563
(1976). See also Trust Co. Bank v. Henderson, 185 Ga. App. 367, 364 S.E.2d 289 (1987).
75. See National Bank v. Refrigerated Transp. Co., i47 Ga. App. 240, 248 S.E.2d
496 (1978).
76. Pargas, 416 So. 2d 1358 and Barnett Bank v. Lipp, 364 So. 2d 28 (Fla. App.
1978) are examples.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
for a deposited item becomes available for withdrawal as of right 77 when
the provisional settlement received by the collecting bank for that item
becomes final7 and when the bank has had a reasonable time to learn
that the settlement is, in fact, final. If the collecting bank is also the
drawee-payor bank, the provisional credit that the collecting bank gives
to the customer's account upon deposit of an ("on us") item that is
finally paid by the bank becomes available for withdrawal as of right
at the opening of the bank's second banking day following receipt of
the item.7 9
Several UCC provisions, however, lengthen the time between deposit
of the item and the time at which the provisional credit may be with-
drawn as of right, especially when the collecting bank is not also the
payor bank. Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:4-107 provides that a col-
lecting bank or payor may fix an afternoon cutoff hour of two p.m.
or later and an item received after the cutoff hour is treated as if it
was received at the opening of the next "banking day." The concept
of a "banking day" itself serves to lengthen the process of collection
by disregarding holidays, weekend days, or any day that a bank is not
open to the public for carrying on substantially all of its banking
functions.80 Additionally, receipt of an item by a collecting or payor
bank's branch office is treated as receipt by a separate bank.8 1 Once
the collecting or payor bank has received an item, the "midnight dead-
line" rule82 determines the time within which the bank must take proper
action on the item (forwarding by a collection bank, determination of
properly payable status by a payor bank), increasing the likelihood of
further delay between deposit and withdrawal of right by the customer.
Moreover, a collecting bank is not required to forward an item directly
to the payor bank."'
Since ninety-nine percent of the 36 billion checks written each year
are honored on first presentment,8 4 and more than one-half of dishonored
77. Under La. R.S. 10:4-201(1) (1983), unless a contrary intent clearly appears, and
prior to the time that a settlement given by a collecting bank for an item is or becomes
formal, the bank is deemed to be an agent of the owner of the item. Any settlement
given for the item is provisional, regardless of the form of, or lack of, indorsement, and
even though the credit to the customer's account is subject to immediate withdrawal as
of right or is in fact withdrawn. As La. R.S. 10:4-201(1) (1983) suggests, a collecting-
depositary bank may elect to permit withdrawals of provisional credit, or honor checks
against provisional credit, prior to receipt by the bank of a final settlement.
78. See La. R.S. 10:4-213(1), (2) & (3), 4-211, 4-301, 4-302 (1983).
79. Id. § 4-213(4)(b) (1983).
80. Id. § 4-104(l)(c) (1983).
81. Id. § 4-106 (1983). See supra text accompanying notes 6-11.
82. Id. §§ 4-104(1)(h), 4-202(2), 4-301(1), (2) (1983).
83. Id. §§ 4-204, 3-504 (1983).
84. D. Whaley, Problems and Materials on Negotiable Instruments 278 (2d ed. 1988).
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checks are honored on a second presentment, it is difficult to justify
an inordinate delay in the availability of funds. Federal Regulation "J,"85
to the extent applicable, 6 reduces the lag time (or "float" period)
between deposit and withdrawal of right.87 Effective September 1, 1988,
The Expedited Funds Availability Act88 requires that all banks, savings
and loan. institutions, and credit unions make funds available to cus-
tomers for withdrawal, with certain exceptions, 9 pursuant to the fol-
lowing schedules:
a. funds from cash deposits, deposits by wire transfer, checks
drawn on the U.S. Treasury, or drawp by a State or unit of
local government, cashier's, teller's, certified or depository checks,
checks deposited in a branch bank and drawn on the same or
85. 12 C.F.R. § 210 (1983).
86. Regulation J, a creation of the Federal Reserve Board, governs the collection of
checks by Federal Reserve Banks. In general, any bank that uses the check collection
facilities of the Federal Reserve System by magnetic encoding on its checks of the Federal
Reserve's MICR routing numbers, becomes subject to Regulation J. See Community Bank
v. Federal Reserve Bank, 500 F.2d 282 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1089, 95 S. Ct.
680 (1974).
87. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 210.9, 210.10, 210.12. When checks are presented to a Reserve
Bank for collection, settlement is made on the basis of a deferred-payment schedule. This
schedule is, with one important exception, based on the amount of time usually required
for the Reserve Bank to collect similar items. Since checks drawn on banks in the same
city are usually collectible on the same day, same-day credit is passed to the depositor.
Checks drawn on banks in other cities that have Federal Reserve offices are usually
collectible the following day; accordingly, one-day credit is passed to the depositor. Two-
day credit is passed when the check is drawn on banks located within the same Federal
Reserve territory but outside of a Reserve Office city. This exception exists because, while
three days may be required to collect checks drawn on banks outside of the Reserve
territory and not located in an office city, two-day credit is the maximum length of
deferment for any check presented to a Reserve Bank for collection. Thus, in this latter
situation the-Reserve Bank pays for a check on the basis of the deferred-payment schedule
one day before that check is actually collected; this effectively generates a one-day, interest-
free loan to the bank involved. The total amount of such loans is known as Federal
Reserve "float." Aggravating the delay problem in the settlement process is some payor
banks' practice of settling by means of drafts drawn on other banks.
To alleviate these problems, the amendments to Regulation J not only advance the time
within which payor banks must settle for checks presented for collection by Reserve Banks,
but also eliminate the use of bank drafts as permissible forms of settlement by requiring
settlement to be in immediately-available funds. Cf. La. R.S. 10:4-211 (1983). The resulting
acceleration of the process, in turn, enables the Reserve Bank in some instances to pass
earlier credit to the depositary bank. From the vantage point of the Federal Reserve, the
changes are particularly desirable since they tend to reduce the problem of "float."
88. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-10 (Supp. 1988). See 43 Bus. Law 1305, 1314-34 (1988); 12
C.F.R. § 229 (1988) (Reg. C.C.).
89. The Act requires, for example, that cashier's, teller's, certified, and government-
issued checks be indorsed only by the person for whom it was issued, in order to qualify
for expedited funds availability. 12 U.S.C. § 4002(a)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(iv), (C)(iv), & (F)(iii).
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another branch of the same banking institution ("on us" checks),
and the first $100 deposited by check or checks on any one
business day 9° shall be available for withdrawal not later than
the business day after the business day of deposit or receipt.9'
b. local checks92
(1) until September 1, 1990, not more than two business
days shall intervene between the business day on which
funds are deposited by a check drawn on a local institution
and the business day on which such funds are available
for withdrawal.9 s
(2) after September 1, 1990, not more than one business
day shall intervene between the business day of deposit
and the business day the funds are available for with-
drawal .94
c. nonlocal checks
(1) until September 1, 1990, not more than six intervening
business days.95
(2) after September 1, 1990, not more than four intervening
business days. 96
90. Defined in the act as any day other than a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
La. R.S. 10:4-104(l)(c) (1983) (defining "banking day").
91. 12 U.S.C. § 4002(a).
92. The act uses the terms "local originating depositary institution" and "nonlocal
originating depositary institution," with "originating" referring to the depositary insti-
tution, or branch thereof, on which a check is drawn. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001(9), (12), (13),
(15) & (17). Under these definitions, a "local check" is one drawn on a bank located
in the same check processing region (served by the same Federal Reserve Bank) as the
one into which it is deposited for collection.
93. 12 U.S.C. § 4002(c)(1).
94. Id. § 4002(b)(1).
95. Id. § 4002(c)(2).
96. Id. § 4002(b)(2).
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